Washington International Law Journal
Volume 16

Number 3

6-1-2007

Intellectual Property Rights and the Public Sector: Why
Compulsory Licensing of Protected Technologies Critical for Food
Security Might Just Work in China
Gregory C. Ellis

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Food and Drug Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gregory C. Ellis, Comment, Intellectual Property Rights and the Public Sector: Why Compulsory Licensing
of Protected Technologies Critical for Food Security Might Just Work in China, 16 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J.
699 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol16/iss3/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Copyright © 2007 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal Association

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: WHY COMPULSORY LICENSING OF
PROTECTED TECHNOLOGIES CRITICAL FOR
FOOD SECURITY MIGHT JUST WORK IN CHINA
Gregory C. Ellis†
Abstract: The majority of people in the developed world have the luxury of never
having to address food shortages and malnutrition. In developing countries, however,
ensuring food security presents greater challenges. Agricultural biotechnology has the
potential to alleviate many of the food crises occurring in developing countries. Unlike
private sector corporations, public sector entities are creating genetically modified
(“GM”) crops to ensure food security. However, the intellectual property rights (“IPRs”)
to the many technologies required to create a single GM crop are often fragmented across
the private and public sectors. Fragmentation of IPRs creates a “patent thicket” that
increases the challenges of developing GM crops that are not restrained by freedom to
operate complications.
China has a successful agricultural biotechnology industry that is almost entirely
public sector. Recently, China strengthened its intellectual property (“IP”) laws as a
result of its accession to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). Despite the beneficial
effects of harmonizing IP laws among WTO member states, there exists a negative
consequence of IP globalization as it pertains to China’s public sector-driven agricultural
biotechnology industry. Stronger IP laws and enforcement will create an environment
more favorable to the interests of foreign private sector entities. Any subsequent
introduction of technologies used to create GM crops will result in the protection of such
technologies under Chinese law, but without open availability under most circumstances.
To reduce the potential frustration of its public sector, China should declare potential
food shortages a national emergency. In doing so, China may require compulsory
licensing of the technologies necessary to create GM crops essential for food security
without violating its WTO obligations. Because the compulsory licenses would be
granted only for selected technologies used to create GM crops, such licensing would
reduce the negative effects of IPRs fragmentation without raising substantial concerns of
compromised innovation resulting from parallel importation.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The developing world has over 800 million undernourished people.1
Nearly eleven million children die each year, with more than half of these
deaths resulting from hunger and malnutrition.2 The vast majority of deaths
attributable to hunger and malnutrition occur in developing countries.3
†
The author would like to thank Professor Sean O’Connor at the University of Washington, School
of Law for his extremely helpful discussions on the topic, the editorial staff at the Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal, and his friends and family.
1
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN
THE WORLD 2005, 30 (2005).
2
Id. at 18.
3
Id.
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Unfortunately, although there is currently enough food to feed the world, it
is unequally distributed, as 650 million of the poorest people live where
agricultural potential is substandard.4 Additional methods of ensuring food
security to prevent hunger and malnutrition beyond the access to food
paradigm must, therefore, be considered.5 Food security “exists when all
people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe
and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an
active and healthy life.”6
Agricultural biotechnology is one promising device heralded to be
valuable in ensuring food security.7 Agricultural biotechnology research
intended to enhance food security in developing countries includes creating
GM crops that reduce the use of pesticides, improve stress tolerance, and
provide better product quality and increased nutritional value.8
The use of agricultural biotechnology to create GM crops is a
contentious issue. Opponents of this technology claim that GM crops are
“inherently dangerous,”9 and that the scientific understanding of the impact
that GM crops have on the environment and human health is inadequate.10
Some of these concerns are legitimate. For example, in September 2000,
trace amounts of a transgenically expressed protein known as Cry9C, which
is approved for animal but not human use, was found in Kraft Taco shells in
the United States.11 These concerns are especially important in developing
countries that are beginning to approve and commercialize GM crops but do
not yet have comprehensive regulatory provisions in place.12

4
Gordon Conway & Gary Toenniessen, Feeding the World in the Twenty-First Century, 402
NATURE C55, C55 (1999).
5
Id.
6
Robert H. Trudell, Food Security Emergencies and the Power of Eminent Domain: A Domestic
Legal Tool To Treat A Global Problem, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 277, 277-78 (2005).
7
Barun Mitra et al., 31 Critical Questions In Agricultural Biotechnology, AGBIOWORLD,
http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/agbio-articles/critical.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2006).
8
Joel I. Cohen, Poorer Nations Turn to Publicly Developed GM Crops, 23 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 27, 31-32 (2005).
9
See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 57
(2001).
10
See Greenpeace International, Say No to Genetic Engineering, http://www. greenpeace.org/
international/ campaigns/genetic-engineering/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2006).
11
Linda Beebe, Note, In re Starlink Corn: The Link Between Genetically Damaged Crops and an
Inadequate Regulatory Frame Work for Biotechnology, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 511,
514-17 (2004).
12
See generally Christina L. Richmond, Genetically Modified Crops in the Philippines: Can
Existing Biosafety Regulations Adequately Protect the Environment?, 15 PAC.RIM L. & POL’Y J. 569 (2006)
(discussing how the Philippines’ existing regulations are inadequate to address the environmental impacts
of agricultural biotechnology).
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Despite such criticisms, proponents of agricultural biotechnology
argue that its benefits far outweigh its potential risks, and that the risks that
do exist are not inherent properties of the technology. According to the
Declaration of Support for Agricultural Biotechnology, signed by over 3400
international scientists, including twenty-five Nobel Prize Laureates,13 the
technologies utilized to create GM crops can safely and substantially
enhance efforts to ensure food security.14 Dr. Patrick Moore, a co-founder
and former leader of Greenpeace who has since signed the Declaration,
stated that “the campaign of fear now being waged against genetic
modification is based largely on fantasy and a complete lack of respect for
science and logic.”15
Critics further assert that agricultural biotechnology corporations
exploit the hungry in developing countries for “commercial opportunity,”
some going as far as labeling this activity as criminal.16 This claim,
however, fails to acknowledge that while the private sector focuses mostly
on crops with large markets, the nonprofit public sector provides the
developing world with subsistence crops to ensure food security, despite
their lack of high commercial value.17
China provides a model for public sector success with respect to
agricultural biotechnology, with almost all research and development in this
field being conducted by the public sector.18 What makes China unique in
comparision to other developing countries’ public sectors is its strong
scientific infrastructure.19 This infrastructure allows Chinese scientists
involved in agricultural research to successfully generate “an impressive
array of new technologies.”20
Furthermore, China’s agricultural
biotechnology industry focuses on providing food security, as “the foods
13

Scientists In Support of Agricultural Biotechnology, AGBIOWORLD, http://www.agbioworld.org/
declaration/index.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2006).
14
Petition In Support of Agricultural Biotechnology, AGBIOWORLD, http://www.agbioworld.org/
declaration/petition/petition.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2006).
15
C.S. Prakash, Greenpeace Founder Supports Biotechnology, AGBIOWORLD, Mar. 6, 2001,
http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/pr/moore.html.
16
Reece Walters, Crime, Bio-Agriculture and the Exploitation of Hunger, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
26, 26 (2006).
17
Richard C. Atkinson et al., Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management, 301
SCIENCE 174, 174 (2003); Eran Binenbaum et al., South-North Trade, Intellectual Property Jurisdiction,
and Freedom to Operate in Agricultural Research on Staple Crops, 51 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE
309, 309-10 (2003).
18
Fred Gale et al., Is Biotechnology in China’s Future?, in CHINA’S FOOD AND AGRICULTURE:
ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 34, 34 (2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/
aib775/aib775m.pdf; Jikun Huang et al., Plant Biotechnology in China, 295 SCIENCE 674, 674 (2002).
19
Huang et al., supra note 18, at 674.
20
Id.
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being modified [in China] reflect the concern that current food production
will not fill the hungry mouths of its future population.”21
Agricultural biotechnology research poses unique IP issues that are
particularly pronounced for the public sector.22 These IP issues lie not with
the GM crops themselves, but with the technologies required to create
them.23 Developing a single GM crop requires numerous technologies.24
Innovators usually protect these technologies via IPRs, most notably
patents,25 which are often held by dissimilar owners.26 IPRs fragmentation
develops when no single IPRs owner has complete ownership of all the
technologies required to create a GM crop.27 In such a situation, all that is
required to hinder the development of an important GM crop is for a single
IPRs holder to refuse to license the technology.28 However, as agricultural
biotechnology research and development in China is driven by the public
sector, fragmentation of IPRs among the public and private sectors has been
largely nonexistent.
On December 11, 2001, China became the 143rd member of the
29
WTO. As a result, China has been strengthening its intellectual property
laws as mandated by the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”) agreement,30 applicable to all WTO members.31 The main
objectives of TRIPS are to improve and harmonize IP protection and to

21
Tom Clarke, China Leads GM Revolution, NATURE, Jan. 25, 2002, http://www.nature.com/news/
2002/020121/full/020121-13.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
22
Conway and Toenniessen, supra note 4, at C57-C58. See generally Atkinson et al., supra note 17
(discusses the IP complications that exist when a single GM crop requires numerous patented technologies
that are owned by multiple entities); Gregory D. Graff et al., The Public-Private Structure of Intellectual
Property Ownership in Agricultural Biotechnology, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 989 (2003) (discusses
the difficulties public sector agricultural biotechnology entities face when private sector entities hold IPRs
to technologies required by the public sector).
23
Atkinson et al., supra note 17, at 174; Graff et al., supra note 22, at 992-994.
24
Atkinson et al., supra note 17, at 174.
25
Although this comment deals with IP issues relating mostly to patents, this comment will broadly
refer to any type of IP protection as IPRs, so as to not inadvertently exclude other types of IP protection
other than patents that might be relevant to issues discussed in this comment.
26
Atkinson et al., supra note 17, at 174.
27
Id.; see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
28
Graff et al., supra note 22, at 989.
29
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE, 9
(2004); see also World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China,
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) (providing the terms of China’s accession agreement).
30
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; Id. at 5.
31
Id. at art. 1; World Trade Organization, Frequently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm#Who'sSigned (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
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introduce compulsion through enforceable sanctions.32 Although the
advantages of IPRs harmonization might outweigh the disadvantages, this
comment will address a unique and potentially negative effect resulting from
the strengthening of IPRs in China.
The strengthening of IPRs in China will help to create an environment
more favorable to the interests of the private sector’s agricultural
biotechnology interests. Consequently, the private sector’s presence will
likely increase in China. This will lead to the fragmentation of IPRs
between China’s public sector and the private sector entities interested in
protecting their technologies for commercial purposes. Such a divide will
frustrate China’s efforts to ensure adequate food security.
This comment argues that, to prevent IPRs fragmentation, China
should exercise its right under TRIPS to mandate compulsory licensing for
protected technologies essential for food security. As compulsory licensing
for pharmaceuticals is controversial due to concerns of parallel importing,
those licenses should only be granted under exceptional circumstances.
However, similar parallel importing concerns would be less substantial for
agricultural biotechnologies in China because the same technologies may be
used for other GM crops with significantly higher commercial value. As a
result, compulsory licenses are more appropriate for agricultural
biotechnologies important to the public sector than for pharmaceutical
products. Part II of this comment describes the issues surrounding the public
sector’s efforts to develop GM crops for purposes of food security, as well as
the current agricultural biotechnology environment in China. Part III
discusses the recent strengthening of Chinese IP laws and enforcement. Part
IV predicts the likelihood and subsequent consequences of an increased
presence of foreign agricultural biotechnology companies in China. Finally,
Part V argues that compulsory licensing of technologies essential for food
security can proceed without violating TRIPS or compromising overall
innovation within the agricultural biotechnology industry.
II.

FRAGMENTED IPRS CREATE CHALLENGES FOR AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY’S PUBLIC SECTOR

In developing countries such as China, the public sector focuses its
research on basic food staples important to local economies.33 When the
32

JOHN REVESZ, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION STAFF RESEARCH PAPER, at xvi (1999), available at
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/staffres/trips/trips.pdf.
33
Cohen, supra note 8, at 31.
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creation of a single GM crop requires multiple technologies, freedom to
operate complications will result if the IPRs holders of such technologies
prevent access to their technologies.
A.

The Public Sector in Developing Countries Anticipates Using
Agricultural Biotechnology to Ensure Food Security

Beginning in the 1960s, agricultural research aimed at increasing the
overall food production in order to meet the demands of a rapidly growing
population resulted in higher yielding varieties of rice, wheat, and maize.34
Known as the Green Revolution, this campaign to increase food security
helped reduce the total number of hungry persons by more than half.35
Today however, over 800 million people are still undernourished,36 and “the
gains in food production provided by the Green Revolution have reached
their ceiling while the world population continues to rise.”37 By the year
2048, the world population will grow from six to nine billion.38 Furthermore,
global warming, deforestation, pollution, overgrazing, soil erosion, and
urbanization will challenge the assurance of adequate food security.39
Although the guarantee of food security will ultimately require
multiple approaches, agricultural biotechnology provides a promising tool to
combat hunger and malnutrition.40 The proportion of the global area of GM
crops grown in developing countries increased every year during the period
from 1996 to 2005.41 Furthermore, the governments of developing countries
in Asia appear to vigorously support agricultural biotechnology.42
34

Conway & Toenniessen, supra note 4, at C55.
Id.
36
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, supra note 1, at 30.
37
Conway & Toenniessen, supra note 4, at C55.
38
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GLOBAL POPULATION AT A GLANCE: 2002 AND BEYOND (2004), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/wp02-1.pdf.
39
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND FOOD
SECURITY 4 (2001) (listing pollution, deforestation, and urbanization); Nsongurua J. Udombana, How
Should We Then Live? Globalization and the New Partnership For Africa’s Development, 20 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 293, 317 (2002) (highlighting global warming); Indra K. Vasil, Biotechnology and Food Security for
the 21st Century: A Real-World Perspective, 16 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 399, 399 (1998) (citing
pollution, overgrazing, and soil erosion); Lauren Sacks & Cynthia Rosenzweig, Climate Change and Food
Security, CLIMATE.ORG, http://www.climate.org/topics/agricul/index.shtml#warming (last visited Jan. 28,
2007) (citing global warming).
40
Conway & Toenniessen, supra note 4, at C55; Mitra et al., supra note 7.
41
CLIVE JAMES, INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS,
GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2005, at 6 (2005).
42
Richmond, supra note 12, at 571; see also RAYMOND HOH, USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL
SERVICE GAIN REPORT, MALAYSIA BIOTECHNOLOGY ANNUAL 2006, at 6-7 (2006); NATIONAL CENTER
FOR GENETIC ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
AGENCY, THAILAND’S NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY FRAMEWORK 2004-2009, at 1 (2005); Clarke,
supra note 21.
35
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Therefore, this comment will assume that agricultural biotechnology will
continue to be a potential avenue for food security in developing Asian
countries. The primary focus of this comment is not to discuss the benefits
and risks of agricultural biotechnology, as exhaustive debates on this subject
may be found elsewhere. Instead, this comment will focus on the IP-related
issues complicating the efforts of China’s public sector to create GM crops
aimed at reducing hunger and malnutrition.
B.

China’s Thriving Agricultural Biotechnology Industry is Public Sector
and Focuses on Food Security

China conducts more research on plant biotechnologies than any other
country outside of North America43 and accounts for over ten percent of all
public sector expenditures on agricultural biotechnology research
worldwide.44 By acreage, China is the fifth largest producer of agricultural
biotechnology crops in the world.45 Furthermore, China’s public sector is
committed to developing GM crops that the developed world has largely
ignored.46 This contrasts sharply with the objectives of private sector
entities that fail to focus on “crops that are important to the world’s poor
farmer.”47 Although China has limited commercial ambitions with respect to
its agricultural biotechnology industry, the industry’s primary focus lacks the
commercial ambitions of other Asian countries. For example, Thailand has
recently launched an aggressive agricultural biotechnology campaign in
hopes that it will become known as “[t]he kitchen of the world.”48 This
campaign exists as an effort to increase its export revenue.49
The incentive to increase food security in China is profound, as
approximately 142 million (eleven percent) of China’s population is
undernourished.50 Although China has less than ten percent of the world’s
arable land, it feeds more than twenty percent of the world’s population.51
With the predicted population increases, China will need to increase its food
grain production by almost forty-five percent by 2020 to maintain its current
43

Clarke, supra note 21.
Huang et al., supra note 18 at 675.
45
USDA FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 2005, at 3.
46
Huang et al., supra note 18 at 674.
47
Id.
48
NATIONAL CENTER FOR GENETIC ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 42, at 6-9
(2005).
49
Id.
50
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 1, at 30.
51
Huang et al., Agricultural Biotechnology Policy Processes in China 7 (2001), available at
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/KNOTS/PDFs/China.pdf.
44
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food supply.52 To reach this goal, China has been increasing its publicly
funded research investments in agricultural biotechnology.53 During the
second half of the last decade, investment in agricultural biotechnology
increased thirty percent per year,54 and in 2004, China spent $200 million on
agricultural biotechnology research.55
The success of China’s agricultural biotechnology research efforts
comes not only from the financial expenditures put forth by public
investment, but also to its strong scientific infrastructure.56 China employs
over two thousand employees in agricultural biotechnology research alone.57
As of 2001, China had close to 150 laboratories located in more than fifty
research institutes and universities working on agricultural biotechnology.58
The Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural
Sciences, provincial academies of agricultural sciences, and general and
agricultural universities carry out China’s agricultural research.59
Furthermore, the percentage of agricultural biotechnology scientists having
Ph.D.s is expected to increase as the ability to conduct Ph.D. educational
programs in biotechnology continues to strengthen.60 These efforts have led
to China’s Ministry of Agriculture’s approval of 585 GM plant experiments,
including 154 environmental releases, as of 2003.61 China’s identification of
over 120 functional genes used in agricultural biotechnology research and
development exemplifies the fruits of its strong scientific infrastructure.62

52

Id. at 7-8.
Jikun Huang & Qinfang Wang, Agricultural Biotechnology Development and Policy in China, 5
AGBIOFORUM 122, 131 (2002).
54
Id.
55
John D. Connor et al., China’s Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology, THE METROPOLITAN
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Dec. 2006, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&
EntryNo=5987 (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
56
Huang et al., supra note 18, at 675.
57
Id.
58
Huang & Wang, supra note 53, at 125.
59
Carl E. Pray, Public and Private Collaboration on Plant Biotechnology in China, 2 AGBIOFORUM
48, 49 (1999).
60
Huang et al., Agricultural Biotechnology Research Indicators: China 8 (Center for Chinese
Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Working Paper, Oct. 2001), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/data/295/5555/674/DC1/4.
61
Jia Hepeng, China Intends to Push For GM Crop Studies, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 14, 2006,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-02/14/content_519960.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
62
Huang et al., supra note 60, at 25.
53
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Fragmentation of IPRs Creates Obstacles for Public Sector Entities
Engaged in Agricultural Biotechnology Research

The fragmentation of IPRs among multiple owners of the technologies
used to create GM crops complicates public sector agricultural
biotechnology research.63 The creation of a single GM crop requires
incremental improvements upon previously derived processes.64 Many of
the incremental improvements pertain to “enabling technologies,” processes
that can be used to create a variety of different GM crops.65 A process that
improves the transfer of an exogenously expressed gene into a host plant is
an example of such an enabling technology.66 When commercial interests
are at stake, however, proprietary owners of one or more of the enabling
technologies required to develop a GM crop may be reluctant to provide
access to the protected technologies.67
Golden Rice, a GM crop, best exemplifies the complexity of the
“patent thicket” created by IPRs fragmentation. Golden Rice is genetically
modified to contain significantly elevated levels of vitamin A as a result of
the transgenic expression of beta-carotene, a vitamin A precursor.68 Chronic
vitamin A deficiency affects between one and two hundred million children,
resulting in permanent blindness for about 500,000 of these children each
year.69 Additionally, between one and three million children die annually of
infections, which would have been preventable had the children acquired
sufficient amounts of vitamin A.70
Golden Rice exemplifies the benefits of GM crops that can
compensate for nutritional deficiencies.71 The potential impact of Golden
Rice, which is predicted to save almost 40,000 lives annually in the
developing world, is astounding.72 The development of Golden Rice,
however, required seventy patent-protected technologies belonging to over
63

Atkinson et al., supra note17, at 174; Graff et al., supra note 22, at 989.
Atkinson et al., supra note 17, at 174.
65
Id.
66
Graff et al., supra note 22, at 992.
67
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 698.
68
See generally Jacqueline A. Paine et al., Improving the Nutritional Value of Golden Rice Through
Increased Pro-Vitamin A Content, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 482 (2005) (scientific publication that
describes the preferential accumulation of beta-carotene in rice through the transgenic expression of the
phytoene synthase gene from maize in combination with the Erwinia uredovora carotene desaturase gene).
69
Stanley P. Kowalski & R. David Kryder, Golden Rice: A Case Study in Intellectual Property
Management and International Capacity Building, 13 RISK 47, 51-52 (2002).
70
Id. at 52.
71
Id. at 51-52.
72
Alexander J. Stein et al., Potential Impact and Cost-Effectiveness of Golden Rice, 24 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1200, 1201 at Table 1 (2006).
64
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thirty public and private sector entities.73 Remarkably, every owner of the
IPRs required to create Golden Rice provided free licenses so that the
product would be available to small farmers in developing countries.74 It is
difficult to determine whether the biotechnology companies that provided
the free licenses did so as a show of humanitarianism or anticipated that such
a gesture would garner larger acceptance of agricultural biotechnology.75 No
matter their motivation, those interested in creating nonprofit GM crops for
purposes of food security may not necessarily find themselves in the same
fortuitous situation that led to the complete and free licenses of Golden Rice.
An advantage of China’s public sector-driven agricultural
biotechnology industry is a lack of fragmentation among private sector
entities. It is difficult to determine whether the absence of IPRs
fragmentation has contributed, in parallel with a strong scientific
infrastructure, to China’s success in the industry. Regardless, private sector
entities that refuse to license enabling technologies required for the
development of GM crops currently do not hinder Chinese efforts of food
security.
III.

CHINA’S MEMBERSHIP IN THE WTO ENCOURAGED THE STRENGTHENING
OF IPRS IN CHINA

TRIPS has applied to China since it became a member of the WTO in
2001.76 The application of TRIPS has subsequently resulted in the
strengthening and harmonization of Chinese IP laws and enforcement as
mandated by the agreement.77
A.

TRIPS Requires WTO Member States to Have Strong IPRs

The main objective of TRIPS is to harmonize intellectual property
laws, which emerged from the realization that IPRs are territorially restricted
to national boundaries and have little or no protection in foreign countries
that do not have similar protections.78 With little to no protection in other
countries, minimal incentive to invest or spread innovation into those
73

Ronald P. Cantrell et al., The Impact of Intellectual Property on Nonprofit Research Institutions
and the Developing Countries They Serve, 6 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 253, 269 (2004).
74
Remigius N. Nwabueze, What Can Genomics and Health Biotechnology Do For Developing
Countries?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 369, 394 (2005); Cantrell, supra note 73, at 270.
75
Sara Boettiger & Alan Bennett, The Bayh-Dole Act: Implications For Developing Countries, 46
IDEA 261, 270 (2006).
76
See TRIPS art. 1.
77
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 29, at 5.
78
Revesz, supra note 32, at 5.
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countries exists.79 Although acceptance of TRIPS is mandatory for any
country now interested in joining the WTO, during negotiations of the
agreement in the 1990s, developing countries were politically encouraged to
accept TRIPS as a WTO requirement. This occurred mainly as a result of
threats of unilateral sanctions, by the United States and the European Union,
against those countries that were infringing upon their IPRs.80 Despite the
ostensible lack of options presented to developing countries during the
TRIPS negotiations, some benefits were provided. For example, trade
restrictions were liberalized for agricultural and textile imports from
developed countries to the developing countries that accepted TRIPS.81
Requiring developing countries to agree to TRIPS, and IP
globalization in general, is an extremely complex and much debated topic.
Opponents of IP globalization view it as an imposition of control by
countries that own the majority of IPRs.82 However, supporters of IP
globalization believe that a recipient country will benefit as a result of
increased foreign investment and technology transfer,83 resulting in greater
economic growth.84
The TRIPS agreement provides enforcement mechanisms in addition
to compliance mechanisms in order to harmonize the member states’ laws.85
Two enforcement provisions exist under TRIPS.86 The first relates to
domestic enforcement, and requires member states to provide effective and
expeditious remedies to prevent infringements.87 The second provides for a
dispute settlement mechanism between two member states through the WTO
itself.88
With respect to biotechnology, the TRIPS agreement contains
important provisions necessary for the promulgation of advancements in
agricultural biotechnology. Agricultural biotechnology management further
poses IP-related issues. Innovations can be easily duplicated, as “seed[s] can
be replanted, genes can be cloned based on sequence information, [and]
79
E. Anthony Wayne, Why Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Matter, GREATWALLIP.COM,
http://www.greatwallip.com/cn/articles/why-protecting-ip-rights-matters.asp.
80
Revesz, supra note 32, at 7.
81
Id.
82
Jorge E. Mayer, Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Agbiotech by Developing Countries, 5
AGBIOTECHNET 1, 3-4 (2003).
83
Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct
Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 149-150 (1998).
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methods can be copied following established protocols.”89 This creates the
demand for increased international IPRs protection for biotechnology
innovations.90 One such provision of TRIPS is the requirement that all WTO
member states protect GM microorganisms.91 This provision parallels
United States patent law interpreted by the landmark United States Supreme
Court case in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which held that bioengineered
microorganisms are patentable.92 Diamond arguably provided a judicial
basis upon which the biotechnology industry flourished.93 Furthermore,
TRIPS stipulates that plant varieties must be protected “either by patents or
by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof.”94 Still to
be resolved however, is whether TRIPS should require mandatory protection
of biotechnology innovations above the level of the microorganism.95
B.

Chinese Patent Law Is Conducive To Biotechnological Innovation

China actively engages in patenting both domestic and foreign
innovations, including those essential for the progression of agricultural
biotechnology. In 2005, the State Intellectual Property Office of China
(“SIPO”) granted 171,000 patents to Chinese citizens, and 42,000 to
foreigners.96 Between 1985 and 1999, Chinese herbal medicines, foodstuffs,
and pharmaceuticals had the largest number of patent applications.97 China
amended its patent law as recently as 2001 and remains consistent with the
requirements of TRIPS.98 One noticeable difference between U.S. and
Chinese patent law is the way in which subject matter is determined.
Although the United States does not specifically bar specific subject

89

Mayer, supra note 82, at 2.
Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement: Diverging
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PROP. L. 41, 50 (1998).
91
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See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that bacteria genetically
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ch. XV Statistics, tbl. 3 Three Kinds of Patent[s] Granted for Home and Abroad, 1985-2005 (2005),
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.htm.
97
Jacqueline Lui, Patenting Biotechnology Inventions in China, 19 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 83, 84
(2001).
98
Id. at 83.
90

JUNE 2007

FOOD SECURITY IN CHINA

711

matter,99 a list of specifically excluded subject matter exists in Chinese
patent law.100
With respect to claim language, products can be either a compound, a
composition, or product defined by a process.101 Because genetic materials
are chemical structures, DNA, RNA, and chromosomes are patentable as
chemical substances under Chinese patent law.102 However, such genetic
materials must be isolated or purified from their natural environment and
cannot be mere discoveries.103 In addition, Chinese patent law does not
allow for the patenting of plant varieties. However, methods of breeding the
plant varieties are allowed.104
C.

Enforcement of IPRs in China is Improving

Although China’s IP laws are consistent with the requirements of
TRIPS, international concerns exist regarding the enforcement of these laws.
With respect to IP protection and enforcement, China is of the highest
priority for the United States. 105 The United States considers China to have
the greatest occurrence of counterfeiting in the world.106 Ninety percent of
all protected goods in China are counterfeits.107 To promote strong IP
protection in China, the United States plans to continue to engage in bilateral
discussions to encourage effective use of trade tools.108 Further efforts will
include the expansion of law enforcement cooperation, education and
capacity building, and private sector cooperation.109 Recently, the United
States has been more assertive, using “high-level meetings to strongly urge
China to take immediate and substantial steps to put it on the path toward
compliance with its critical TRIPS Agreement obligation to make available
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effective enforcement mechanisms.”110 The United States has also been
considering WTO dispute settlement options.111
Although a significant percentage of IP violations in China are
copyright and trademark issues, biotechnology continues to be a problem, as
ninety seven percent of small molecule pharmaceuticals in China are
copies.112 Pharmaceutical (and presumably agricultural biotechnology)
counterfeits are particularly worrisome with respect to safety concerns
resulting from the lack of regulatory approval.113 Specific to IP violations of
agricultural biotechnology innovations, the only foreign product to be
commercialized in China thus far, Monsanto’s Bt cotton,114 has suffered
economic setbacks resulting from counterfeiting.115
The improvement of IP enforcement is a focus of Chinese intellectual
property policy. Currently, China’s IP laws and regulations provide for IP
enforcement through administrative authorities, criminal prosecutions, and
civil action.116 At the Joint Commission of Commerce and Trade meeting
with the United States in 2004, China committed itself to increasing IP
enforcement and agreed to move forward with legislative and judicial
measures to improve its protection of IPRs.117 Furthermore, the National
IPR[s] Protection Working Group Office formulated “China’s Action Plan on
IPR[s] Protection 2006” to “better protect [] IPR[s], resolutely punish and
combat various infringement and other illegal activities.”118 The plan
focuses mainly on improving IP enforcement.119 With respect to patents, the
plan aims to both standardize the conduct of patent agents and to revise and
issue a guide on patent review.120
China is further attempting to strengthen enforcement of its IPRs
through litigation. The number of Chinese patent litigation cases has been
increasing, indicating that “awareness of the exploitation and enforcement of
110
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113
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Id. at 59.
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intellectual property is building, and that the Chinese economy is becoming
more technology-intensive.”121 Lawsuits in China related to IPRs are
grouped into two types of categories: patent administrative lawsuits that are
similar to criminal cases between SIPO and a private party, and patent civil
lawsuits.122 In 2005, Chinese courts tried 3529 patent administrative
lawsuits involving IPRs violations, a twenty-eight percent increase from the
previous year.123 Additionally, 13,393 civil cases were tried for IPRs
violations in 2005, which was a thirty-eight percent increase from the
previous year.124 The increases in IPRs-related litigation appear to be part of
a larger trend, as Chinese courts adjudicated a total of 23,636 IP-related
cases for the entire four year period between 1998 and 2002, a forty
percentage increase from the previous four year period.125
In spite of the efforts of the United States and China, sufficient
enforcement of IPRs in China continues to be a challenging undertaking.
This can be attributed to a complexity of factors, including the lack of
government coordination, local corruption, high thresholds for criminal
prosecution, and lack of resources and training.126 Nonetheless, China’s
strengthening of its IP laws and enforcement are creating a setting more
favorable to the interests of foreign agricultural biotechnology companies.
IV.

STRONGER IP ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA WILL LIKELY RESULT IN IPRS
FRAGMENTATION AMONG PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES

While the harmonization of IP laws among WTO member states has
had beneficial effects, the strengthening of Chinese IP laws and enforcement
is likely to have negative consequences on China’s agricultural
biotechnology industry. With the increase in private sector IPRs protection,
the introduction of fragmentation of IPRs among the private and public
sector will occur. This will further increase the challenges China faces with
respect to its efforts to ensure food security.
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Foreign Agricultural Biotechnology Companies Have Historically
Been Reluctant to Invest in China

Weak IP protection may be a factor in the public sector domination of
China’s agricultural biotechnology. Strong IP protection in developing
countries is theorized to encourage innovation while providing the economic
confidence needed to attract foreign investment.127
Foreign direct
investment, which is the result of the establishment of production
subsidiaries by a foreign enterprise, can be a source of capital and
technology transfer.128
Technology transfer is “the application of
technologies in new geographic or product areas . . . ”129 Subsequently, this
increase in foreign investment and technology transfer will ultimately
“translate into faster rates of economic growth.”130
Although maximum IP protection may not necessarily lead to the
greatest amount of foreign investment,131 “various authors have found lack
of enforcement to be a deterrent for foreign direct investment.”132 This is
more true with agricultural biotechnology than with other industries in China
that do not have weak foreign direct investment, as the cost of developing a
GM crop may be over $150 million.133 Without strong IPRs, the industry
would not be able to bear the substantial investment risk associated with
agricultural biotechnology.134 As described previously, the only private
sector GM crop from abroad to have been previously adopted to a
substantial degree in China was a cotton variety made by Monsanto.135
However, because of China’s weak IPRs at the time, Monsanto exposed
itself to “significant local piracy” of its seeds, resulting in a loss of
investment income.136
127
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In addition to the reluctance of foreign companies to invest in
agricultural biotechnology due to investment risk, foreign agricultural
biotechnology companies may be reluctant to invest in China because of
protectionist measures taken by the Chinese government. One form of
protectionism is based on restrictions on foreign agricultural biotechnology
firms, which may be keeping many foreign agricultural biotech firms from
entering the Chinese market.137 These restrictions may have occurred “to
frustrate the commercial ambitions of Western [agricultural biotechnology]
firms.”138 This apparent protectionism is possibly attributed to the desire of
China’s public sector-dominated agricultural biotechnology industry to catch
up to the advances made by foreign entities.139
Protectionism in China’s biotechnology industries may eventually
ease as China develops a stronger IP regime. In agricultural biotechnology’s
sister industry, pharmaceuticals, recent attempts at protectionism have been
unsuccessful. In 2004, the Chinese Patent Office invalidated Pfizer’s Viagra
patent because of insufficient disclosure.140 This decision caused immediate
polarization among the Chinese and United States governments and caused
the U.S. Embassy in Beijing to issue a warning that this decision may deter
foreign investment due to insufficient IPRs protection.141 However, others
commented that the decision of the Chinese Patent Office was not indicative
of protectionism, but actually an indication of stronger IP protection
resulting from more stringent analyses of patent applications.142 In June
2006, a Chinese court revoked the invalidation of the patent, essentially
giving Pfizer patent protection for Viagra in China.143 Whether this
particular case was indicative of China’s commitment to stronger IPRs or a
weakening of protectionism due to political pressures is difficult to
determine. In either case, it may be viewed as yet another suggestion of
confidence for the biotechnology private sector in expanding their
commercial interests to China.
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Increased Interest in Agricultural Biotechnology from Foreign
Companies Would Bring with It Increased IPRs Fragmentation

Two factors are likely to increase the presence of the private sector
from abroad in China: the strengthening of IPRs and the weakening of
protectionism. In 2004, Roche Pharmaceuticals announced the creation of a
research and development center in China.144 A major factor in convincing
Roche to establish the center in China was the recent strengthening of
IPRs.145 It is difficult to conclusively determine whether private sector
agricultural biotechnology companies from abroad will also begin to
seriously invest in the Chinese market. Nonetheless, an environment
conducive to private sector interests has become more favorable in recent
years.
As a result of such a setting in which foreign private sector entities
will no longer hesitate to invest, China will likely see an increase in foreign
agricultural biotechnology companies wishing to expand the protection of
their enabling technologies under Chinese law. Such technologies will
unquestionably include processes that can be used to create GM crops that
the public sector believes necessary to ensure food security. Consequently,
emergence of the private sector will lead to issues of IPRs fragmentation
among the private and public sectors as seen in other developing
countries.146 Accordingly, China must protect the interests of its public
sector from this highly probable occurrence.
V.

REQUIRING COMPULSORY LICENSING OF CRITICAL IPRS WILL
FACILITATE CHINA’S OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING FOOD SECURITY

China’s stronger IP laws and improvements in enforcement will likely
result in IPRs fragmentation between foreign private sector agricultural
biotechnology companies and China’s public sector.
However, the
implementation of a compulsory licensing scheme could function to prevent
encumbrances of advances made towards food security.
Because
compulsory licenses would be granted for selected enabling technologies
used to create GM crops, and not the product itself, such licensing would not
raise substantial concerns of parallel importing. As a result, concerns of
compromised innovation would be minimal.

144
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TRIPS and Chinese Patent Law Permit Compulsory Licensing

Compulsory licenses can be utilized to force an IPRs owner to share
its protected technology. A compulsory license is a type of nonexclusive
license resulting from governmental action.147 It allows one party to produce
a protected product or process without the consent of another party that
owns the rights to the intellectual property.148 The policy behind compulsory
licensing is to adjust “the balance between public interests and the private
interests of patent holders by providing an exception to the exclusive rights
normally provided by [an intellectual property right].”149
While TRIPS doesn’t explicitly use the phrase “compulsory
licensing,” the phrase “other use without authorization of the right holder”
found in Article 31 implies that it permits WTO member states to include a
compulsory licensing provision in their IP laws.150 However, compulsory
licensing “can only be done under a number of conditions aimed at
protecting the legitimate interests of the patent holder.”151 The constraints
must meet at least one of five “broadly defined public purposes: (1) to
ameliorate a refusal to deal (essentially a failure to work the patent); (2) to
address a health or other emergency of extreme urgency; (3) to resolve
anticompetitive practices; (4) for noncommercial use; and (5) for dependent
patents.”152
Chinese patent law permits compulsory licensing under requisite
conditions.153 However, a compulsory license has never been granted
against a non-Chinese corporation’s protected property.154 Apart from this
fact, China is not prohibited from licensing a foreign corporation’s
technology that is protected under Chinese patent law, as long as Article 31
of TRIPS is not violated.
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Compulsory Licensing Is Controversial Due to Concerns that Such
Licenses May Deter Innovation

Proponents of compulsory licensing claim that public interest matters
of public health and welfare outweigh the exclusive rights of an IPRs
owner.155 The idea of using compulsory licenses is most common with
respect to providing readily available drugs in the developed world to
developing countries; most notably for HIV drugs in Africa.156 However,
proposals that suggest the use of compulsory licensing for technologies
related to food security have been comparatively minimal.157
Compulsory licensing is not free from criticism. Because strong IPRs
are necessary to drive innovation, an argument against compulsory licensing
is that investment in potential inventions would be “less secure and less
attractive” to the innovator.158 As director of the National Institutes of
Health, Harold Varmus stated with respect to nonexclusive licenses in
general, “[i]t is well documented that technologies with potential as
therapeutics are rarely developed into products without some form of
exclusivity, given the large development costs associated with bringing the
product to the market.”159 Thus, at least with respect to the pharmaceutical
industry, compulsory licenses should only be granted under exceptional
circumstances.
The loss of incentive to innovate specifically associated with
compulsory licensing occurs mainly because such licenses encourage
parallel importing.160 Parallel importing, otherwise known as the gray
market, takes place when a product that is provided inexpensively to one
country is sold to another country where a lucrative market exists, but
without permission from the IPRs holder.161
With respect to
155
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pharmaceuticals, it is argued that compulsory licensing schemes will
actually decrease the access to life-saving drugs by reducing the innovative
incentive to research and develop the original drug.162 This would result
because the generic drug manufacturers would never have the opportunity to
copy the original compound.163
Various royalty arrangements have been proposed to deal with the
issue of lost incentive resulting from forced licenses.164 Such schemes could
create incentive by either providing an upfront fee to the IPRs holder that
was forced to give up his or her rights, or provide payments as the
commercial value is determined.165 Thus, it has been argued that reasonable
royalties resulting from compulsory licensing would not significantly
discourage the investment required to innovate.166 However, whether a
royalty scheme is even appropriate for a compulsory license provided to a
public sector entity for technologies leading to a product with low
commercial value is questionable.167
C.

China Should Take Advantage of the Flexibility of TRIPS to Utilize
Compulsory Licenses for Technologies Critical to Food Security

China should utilize the emergency language168 of the compulsory
licensing provisions of TRIPS to allow compulsory licensing of technologies
critical for food security.169 In response to concerns that TRIPS might hinder
efforts to control diseases of public health importance such as HIV,
tuberculosis, and malaria, WTO members adopted a special Ministerial
Declaration on November 14, 2001 at the WTO Ministerial Conference in
Doha.170 The conference resulted in the further adoption of the Doha
162
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163
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Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Doha Declaration
on TRIPS”),171 which reaffirmed flexibility for TRIPS member states in
circumventing IPRs for sufficient access to essential medicine.172 This
Declaration not only reaffirms the right to grant compulsory licenses and to
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted, but allows each
member state to determine what constitutes a “national emergency or other
circumstance[] of extreme urgency . . . ”173
In 2003, the WTO implemented a provision that permits WTO
member states to make drugs for an overseas market if they receive notice
from a country with inadequate manufacturing capacity of its own.174 As a
result, China’s IP implemented the 2003 WTO decision through Order 37, an
administrative order further interpreting Chinese Patent Law.175 China’s
Order 37 substantiates the willingness of China to implement WTO
declaratory provisions pertaining to compulsory licensing.
TRIPS does not prohibit the use of compulsory licenses for
technologies relevant to food security. This is exemplified by the fact that
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS did not clarify the term “national
emergency” as it relates to when such licenses may be granted.176 As a
result, this flexibility in interpreting TRIPS will actually benefit China’s
public sector. China could, therefore, declare food shortages a national
emergency, which would subsequently authorize the use of compulsory
licenses for technologies required to create relevant GM crops. For these
reasons, China should issue an administrative order similar to Order 37 that
would implement the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and interpret significant
hunger or malnutrition as a national emergency to reserve the right to grant
compulsory licenses for such purposes.
Proposals to grant compulsory licenses to address issues of food
security have only considered whether such licenses would be feasible if
granted by the United States.177 More specifically, these arguments
171
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discussed the ways in which the United States has failed to address how “the
compulsory license provisions in Article 31 [of TRIPS] would apply to allow
access to the tools of biotechnology for developing-country food security
purposes.”178 This comment proposes, in broad terms, that developing
countries that are WTO member states should utilize their ability to grant
compulsory licenses if necessary to ensure food security. In narrower terms,
this comment argues that compulsory licenses for issues of food security
would be most advantageous to China as a result of its already successful
agricultural biotechnology industry. Accordingly, China could use these
measures to protect its interests in ensuring food security without violating
its WTO obligations under TRIPS.
D.

China Should Not Refrain from Granting Compulsory Licenses Due to
Concerns that Doing So Might Interfere with Innovation

Compulsory licensing of IPRs for technologies critical to food
security in China will not deter innovation. The scenario in which
compulsory licenses would be utilized in China will result after the
introduction of a commercialized GM crop into the Chinese market by a
foreign agricultural biotechnology company. The foreign company will
likely anticipate being granted some sort of IP protection under Chinese law
for the essential enabling technologies used to create the GM crop.
The demand for a compulsory license may occur in one of two ways if
the Chinese public sector develops its own GM crop essential for food
security. First, the Chinese entity could autonomously develop a similar
technology that falls within the scope of the protection provided to the
private sector entity. Conversely, the Chinese entity might simply recognize
the technology as being necessary to develop a particularly vital GM crop
and wish to adapt it to its own research and development. In either scenario,
a compulsory license may be granted to create the GM crop necessary for
food security if China were to interpret significant hunger or malnutrition as
a national emergency as permitted by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS.179
Incentive to innovate on the side of the private sector company will
not be compromised if the Chinese government grants compulsory licenses
in the requisite scenario. This results from the fact that the license will only
be enforceable in China and will be used solely by China’s public sector for
noncommercial purposes. More importantly, issues of parallel importing
with respect to GM crops will not be as significant as with pharmaceuticals.
178
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With pharmaceuticals, concerns of compromised innovation occur when a
patented product, the drug itself, experiences parallel importing. In contrast,
because the compulsory licenses that this comment suggests would only be
granted by the Chinese government for selected enabling technologies, and
not for the GM crop as a whole, parallel importing would be less of a
concern.
Even if parallel importation of GM crops does occur, most of the GM
crops currently created by China’s public sector do not have significant
commercial value. As a result, the same technologies could still be used to
create additional GM crops with high commercial value in the same country
where the GM crops might be parallel imported to. This would allow the
IPRs owner to retain his or her investment interest. This comment,
therefore, suggests that with respect to agricultural biotechnology, concerns
of lost innovation resulting from a gray market should be decoupled from
similar concerns that are omnipresent within the pharmaceutical industry.
Hence, granting compulsory licenses for noncommercial crops that will be
utilized only in China would not be grounds for foreign companies to lose
their incentive to innovate these technologies for additional markets that are
more favorable to financial recovery.
Notwithstanding the fact this comment argues that a compulsory
licensing scheme geared towards ensuring food security will not
compromise innovation, China should nonetheless be sensitive to how the
private sector might perceive such licenses. This results from the likelihood
that the introduction of foreign technology could actually benefit China’s
future efforts of ensuring food security, in spite of IPRs fragmentation. One
must only look at the promise of Golden Rice,180 despite the fact that the
creation of most GM crops will not experience similar cooperation among
the private sector.181 As a result, China should not hesitate to exercise its
ability to grant compulsory licenses for fear that doing so might discourage
any humanitarian effort provided for by the private sector, no matter how
unlikely such effort might seem.
VI.

CONCLUSION

GM crops have the potential to alleviate chronic malnutrition and
hunger, to make more efficient use of farmland, and to further reduce soil
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erosion and the use of pesticides.182 Agricultural biotechnology is not a
panacea that will solve world hunger,183 but it is one promising way in which
the problem can be addressed.184 As a result of continued population
growth, global warming, and other environmental factors that are
contributing to the challenges of food security,185 it may be argued that it is
unethical not to recognize agricultural biotechnology’s potential with respect
to the world’s hungry.
China is likely to see an increase in the presence of agricultural
biotechnology companies from abroad, possibly utilizing China’s stronger IP
laws and enforcement as a way to protect their investments. Because of the
significant financial investment required to create a GM crop, agricultural
biotechnology companies have been more hesitant to invest in China than
have other industries. In addition to strong IP protection, other factors such
as protectionism and the difficulties associated with GM crop
management,186 may determine whether the private sector will attempt to
import their technologies into China. All the same, the probability that the
private sector will begin to seek protection under Chinese law of their
enabling technologies used to create GM crops in the near future is
becoming more likely.
China must, therefore, prepare for the consequences that will arise as
a result of the strengthening of its IP laws. Because the broad language of
TRIPS does not prohibit the declaration of a food shortage as a national
emergency, China should not hesitate to grant compulsory licenses against
foreign agricultural biotechnology companies. Such licenses would not raise
considerable concerns of parallel importing and, therefore, the incentive to
innovate would not be defeated. The result would provide for protection
against the limitations on the availability of technologies critical for food
security that may result from the recent strengthening of China’s IP laws and
enforcement.
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